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IMPLIED CONSENT FOR INTOXICATION TESTS
Ever since automobiles became more than a novelty, the problem of
the drinking operator has been an increasing threat to the health, welfare,
and safety of the people of the United States. In Wyoming the incidence
of drinking in fatal accidents has increased from 20.7% in 1957 to 28.1%
in 1961.'
Wyoming, like the other states, has been cognizant of this problem.
We have a statute providing for a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars or not more than thirty days in jail, or both, plus suspension of a
license, if a person is convicted of driving while "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driv2
ing a motor vehicle."
However, obtaining a conviction for this offense under the statute,
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "has taken
into his stomach a sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor so as to deprive him of the normal control of his bodily or mental faculties." State v.
Dobbs.3 In its form prior to 1955 the statute placed an almost impossible
burden on the prosecution and very few convictions were obtained. Basically, the problem was one of proof. Establishing intoxication required
testimony as to the outward symptoms shown by the defendant, and convincing witnesses were hard to obtain.
In recognition of this fact, Wyoming added to its statute in 19554 a
provision allowing the results of various chemical tests to be admitted
as evidence, and setting up a presumption that any person shown by such
tests to have ".15,
or more by weight of alcohol" in his blood stream
will be presumed to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a
degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle.
This aids in the solution of the problem of proof by reducing the question
to a matter of reliable objective standards. However, the problem of the
drunken driver has not been eliminated, for the simple reason that there
are no means provided in the statute compelling anyone to undergo these
tests; they were and still are purely a matter of voluntary submission. For
this reason, only those persons who are confident that the tests will vindicate them ever volunteer. For what it is worth the prosecution may be
able to comment upon the refusal to take a test,5 but this is a poor sub1. Traffic Accident Facts, 1961, prepared by the Accident Reports Section of the
Wyo. Highway Dept.
2. Wyo. Stat. § 31-129 (1957).
3. 70 Wyo. 26, 244 P.2d 280, 284 (1952).
4. Chapter 97, § 1 Session Laws of Wyo. (1955).
5. State v. Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Delaware, 1963); City of Columbus v. Waters, 124
N.E.2d 841 (Ohio, 1954) ; State v. Buek, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958) ; State v.
Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168,
300 N.W. 275 (1941) . Contra, see State v. Serverson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (North Dakota,
1956); People v. Stratton 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362, aff. 133 N.E.2d 516,
1956); People v. Stratton 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362, aff. 133 N.E.2d 516
(1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1104 (Oklahoma, 1957).
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stitute for the tests and probably not the solution that the legislators were
hoping for when they added the chemical tests provision to the statute.

At the present time the alternative is for the arresting officers to
force the defendant to submit to the intoxication tests. This is especially
tempting where the defendant is unconscious. This procedure probably
violates several of the defendant's constitutional rights and therefore is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence.
The main constitutional issue likely to be raised, if the tests are forced,
is that the taking of the blood, breath, urine, or whatever, constitutes an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 4, of the Wyoming
Constitution. If the evidence is so obtained, it is inadmissible as evidence
against the defendant.0
Clearly, the taking of a body sample is considered to be a search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The question
then to be resolved is whether the search is reasonable and lawful. A
search and seizure will be lawful if made pursuant to a valid search warrant, 8 if made as incident to a lawful arrest,9' or if made with the consent
of the person.1 0 Since we are assuming that the consent of the person
involved has not been obtained, we will examine the other two possibilities
only.
The law of arrest is well settled and a summary should suffice. A
lawful arrest for a misdemeanor such as drunken driving may be made
pursuant to a valid warrant of arrest, or if the misdemeanor is actually
committed in the presence of the arresting officer."

If one of these two

elements is present, the officer may search the person of the defendant for
evidence.12 An officer could not arrest without a warrant on his mere
suspicion that the person is drunk. If the arrestee is later acquitted because of the difficulty of proving drunkeness, the officer might be subject
to civil liability.
The Wyoming Supreme Court set out the requirements of a valid
search warrant in State v. Patterson.'3 The opinion points out that the
supporting affidavit must be supported by probable cause and not merely
information and belief.
The second possible constitutional objection to forcing the tests and
6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
7. State v. Wolf, 53 Del. 88, 164 A.2d 865 (1960);. State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266.
79 N.W.2d 810 (1957).
8. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4; State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342 (1920) ; Wiggins
v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373 (1922).
9. Wiggin v. State, supra, note 8 at 491; State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac. 683 (1924).
Pac 683 (1924).
10. Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 369, 255 Pac 788 (1927).
11. State.v. George, supra note 9 at 231.
12. Wiggin v. State, supra note 8.
13. Supra note 8.
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attempting to use the results as evidence is that they would probably
violate the Wyoming Constitution Article 1,Section 11, which states that
"No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal
case .... '14
There are two views as to the meaning of this provision in the various
state constitutions. The majority view is that it only applies to testimonial
compulsion. 15 The minority view is that this provision protects from all
evidence which requires the active participation of the defendant to obtain, but does not protect from evidence taken from him which merely
requires his passive cooperation. Under this view, whether he consented
or not would be immaterial. 16 A second minority group applies the protection to all evidence taken from a defendant without his consent including any real evidence taken from his person. Wyoming has had no
occasion to meet this issue squarely. However, dictum indicates that the
Wyoming court may follow the minority view and apply the restriction to
7
any evidence taken from a person without permission.'
If Wyoming restricts the meaning of Article 1 Section 11 to testimonial
compulsion as many of its neighbors do' s there would be no problem. If,
however, Wyoming would follow the minority view, under any of the
tests which require active participation, the evidence would be inadmissible.' 9 It is submitted, however, that all of the chemical tests for alcohol
in the blood could be performed without defendant's active participation.
Of course every one of the tests could be performed without his cons'ent.
The third possibility is that these tests would fall within the Rochin
v. California rule. 20 That case held inadmissible under the due process
provision 21 evidence which was obtained by such a process as "shocks the
conscience." It seems highly unlikely that chemical intoxication tests,
including blood tests, would shock the conscience. The Supreme Court
of Arizona has held that a defendant who refuses to submit to a drunkometer test may be compelled to do so by any force reasonably necessary to
fit the apparatus over his head; and that the use of such force does not
violate due process. 2
A Kansas case has held that chemical tests for in23
toxication do not violate due process.
Clearly these constitutional barriers are formidable enough to prevent
the effective use of the Wyoming intoxication test statute if suspects are
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is similar, but it
has been held in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) not to be a fundamental right binding on the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 264; 8 Wigmore on Evidence
2263; People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105, 194 P.2d 681 (1948).
Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J.Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (1930) ; State v. Sturtevant, 96
N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); Aiken v. State, 16 Ga. App. 848, 86 S.E. 1076 (1915);
People v. Sturman, 209 Mich. 284, 176 N.W. 397 (1920).
State v. George, supra note 9 at 236, (dictum).
(Idaho) State v. Buek, supra note 5; (New Mexico) Breithaupt v. Abram, 58
N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1959); (Colorado) Vigil v. People, 134 Col. 126, 300 P.2d
545 (1956).
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forced to submit to the tests. For this reason it has been proposed that
an "implied consent" statute be added to the Wyoming Driver's Licensing
Law.2

4

Basically, such a provision would make the driving on Wyoming

highways an implied consent to submit to an intoxication test if arrested on
a charge of drunken driving. Upon a refusal, the driver's license of the
suspect would be subject to forfeiture. This will not force the drinking
driver to submit to an intoxication test, but it would accomplish the legislative purpose by removing him from the highways.
Such a statute would avoid the constitutional objections to the forced
use of intoxication tests which have been discussed above. It would appear
that the arrest required by the implied consent statute, coupled with the
implied consent, would be sufficient to overcome any objection as to unlawful search and seizure. -' There may be a serious question as to whether
this arrest provision will protect against an unlawful search and seizure
when the defendant was unconscious. There is some authority for the
proposition that a person mnst have understood that lie was being arrested.2 6 However, in State v. Cram27 an unconscious person was arrested
and given an intoxication test, with the approval of the Supreme Court of
Oregon. However, the question apparently was conceded by counsel and
not raised on appeal in that instance. If the defendant is conscious and
does actively object, he will not be forced to take the tests but his driver's
license will be subject to revocation.
Since any evidence obtained by the means provided under the statute
would be lawfully acquired, it would not be subject to the self-incrimination
provision of the Wyoming Constitution. 28
As already pointed out, intoxication tests probably do not shock the
conscience so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, even when performed on an junconscious body. The impiled consent statute would provide the additional assurance of implied
consent should this question ever arise.
If such a statute were to be enacted, it would have to meet the requirements of substantive and procedural due process to be valid. These
requirements are, of course, based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
19. Possibly even under the minority view a blood test would be admissible as it does
not require any active participation of the defendant. One would do well to
remember that it may be an unreasonable search and seizure, however, and thereby
be inadmissible under the doctrine of State v. George, supra note 9.
20. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
21. U.S. Const., Amend. 14.
22. State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953). (Overruled on another point).
23. Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 571, 358 P.2d 765 (1961).
24. Report No. 63-8 of the Wyoming Legislative Council (1962).
25. The implied consent without the arrest has been held insufficient in New York,
Schutt v. Macduff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1954).
26. 6 C.J.S., Arrest § 1, 571.
27. 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945).
28. State v. George, supra note 9, holds that evidence obtained as the result of a
lawful search and seizure would not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
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The requirements of substantive due process are threefold. The
statute must be directed at a matter properly subject to state regulation; the
means selected must bear a real and substantial relationship to the objective
of the regulation; and the measure must not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious.29 Controlling drunken driving is certainly a valid object
of state regulation; an implied consent statute would undoubtedly bear
a real and substantial relationship to this control in that it would tend to
decrease the amount of drunk driving; and there is nothing arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious about such a statute. Hence, it should meet the
tests of reasonableness without difficulty5 0
The primary requirements of procedural due process are adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard; an implied consent statute patterned after the Uniform Implied Consent Act would stand the test of
procedural due process. The Uniform Act provides for notice and a
31
hearing.
It would appear then, that such a statute would be constitutional.
This is strengthened by cases, in states which have adopted such statutes,
wherein the constitutionality of the implied consent statute was challenged
to no avail.3 2 In only one instance have they been invalidated, and that
was the New York case already noticed.3 3 After a provision for arrest was
34
amended into the statute, it was sustained.
The big question remaining is whether it would improve the situation.
At least three reasons appear to indicate that it should. First, the pressure
of possible loss of driving privileges will encourage borderline persons to
take the tests; secondly, persons who know the tests will prove they are
drunk and refuse to take them may be removed from the highways as a
threat to the safety and welfare of others; and third, knowledge of the
existence of the statute may deter people from drinking before they drive.
It seems clear that the provision in the Wyoming Statutes providing
for intoxication tests is not functioning as the legislators had hoped it
would. It further appears that the addition of an implied consent provision would assist in obtaining adequate regulation and control of the
29. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). The due process provision of the
Wyoming Constitution, Article I, Section 6, has been interpreted the same way in
McGowey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, 96 Pac. 697 (1908).
30. Lee v. State, supra note 22, at p. 770 state: "The statute does not compel one
in plaintiff's position to submit to a blood test, and does not require one to
incriminate himself within the meaning of constitutional provisions. And neither

is it violative of due process." (emphasis supplied).
31. Uniform Vehicle Code § 6-205. 1 (d).
31. Uniform Vehicle Code § 6-205. 1 (d).
32. (Kansas) Lee v. State, supra note 22; (South Dakota) Stenstand v. Smith, 116
N.W.2d (1962); (North Dakota) Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (1961); (Idaho)
State v. Buek, supra note 5; (Nebraska) Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 172
Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961).
33. Schutt v. Macduff, supra note 24.
34. Anderson v. Macduff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1955) ; Combes v. Kelly,
152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1956); Taylor v. Kelly, 9 Misc. 2d 240, 171 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1957);

Clancy v. Kelly, 7 A.D.2d 820, 180 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1958).
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drinking driver. Such a statute or a similar one has already been adopted
by ten states. 35 It could be done in Wyoming through the addition of
such a'provision to Wyo. Stat. §31-250, (1957) patterned after the following Uniform Vehicle Code Provision:
31-250 (b) (1) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon
the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given
consent, subject to the provisions of sec. 31-129, to a chemical test
or tests of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested or otherwise taken
into custody for any offense and if the arresting officer shall
have reasonable cause to believe that prior to his arrest the person
was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The test
or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement
officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have
been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon
the public highways of the State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The law enforcement agency by which such
officer is employed shall designate which of the aforesaid tests
shall be administered.
(2) Any person who is dead, unconscious or who is otherwise in
a condition rendering him incapable of refusal, shall be deemed
not to have withdrawn the consent provided by subsection (b) (1)
of this section and the test or tests may be administered, subject
to the provisions of 31-129.
(3) If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law
enforcement officer to submit to one or more chemical tests designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in subsection
(b) (1) of this section, none shall be given, but the department,
upon the receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer
that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
upon the public highways of this State while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor and that the person had refused to submit to
the test upon the request of the law enforcement officer, shall
revoke his license or permit to drive, or any nonresident operating
privilege; or if the person is a resident without a license or permit
to operate a motor vehicle in this State, the department shall deny
to the person the issuance of a license or permit for a period of six
months after the date of the alleged violation, subject to review
as hereinafter provided.
(4) Upon revoking the license or permit to drive, or nonresident
operating privilege of any person, or upon determining that the
issuance of a license or permit shall be denied to the person, as
hereinbefore in this section directed, the department shall immediately notify the person in writing and upon his request shall
35.

(Idaho) Idaho Code (1961 Supp.) §§ 49-352 to 49-355; (Kansas) Gen. Stat. of
Kan. Ann. (1961 Supp.) §1 8-1001 to 8-1004; (Minnesota) Laws of Minn. 1961, cl.
454: (Nebraska) Rev. Stat. of Neb. (1961 Supp.) § 39-727.03 et. seq.; (New York)
McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. Ann. (1961 Supp.) Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1194:
(North Dakota) N.D. Century Code Ann. (1961 Supp.) § 39-20-01 to 39-20-12;
(South Dakota) S.D.C. (1960 Supp.) § 44.0302-2 et. seq.; (Utah) Utah Code Ann.
(1961 Supp.) § 41-6-44.10; (Vermont) Vt. Stat. Ann. (1959 Supp.) Title 23 §§ 1188
to 1194; and (Virginia) Acts of Assembly 1962, ch. 625. 36. Supra note 24.
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afford him an opportunity for a hearing in the same manner
and under the same conditions as is provided in section 31-273 (4)
for notification and hearings in the cases of discretionary suspension of licenses, except that the scope of such a hearing for the
purposes of this section shall cover the issues of whether a law
enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person
had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of this State while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was placed
under arrest, and whether he refused to submit to the test upon
request of the officer. Whether the person was informed that
his privilege to drive would be revoked or denied if he refused to
submit to the test shall not be an issue. The department shall
order that the revocation or determination that there should be
a denial of issuance either be rescinded or sustained.
(5) If the revocation or determination that there should be a
denial of issuance is sustained after such a hearing the person whose
license or permit to drive or nonresident operating privilege has
been revoked, or to whom a license or permit is denied under the
provisions of this section, shall have the right to file a petition in
the District Court to review the final order of revocation or denial
by the department in the same manner and under the same conditions as is provided in section 6-211 in the cases of discretionary
revocations and denials.
(6) When it has been finally determined under the procedures of
this section that a nonresident's privilege to operate a motor vehicle
in this State has been revoked, the department shall give information in writing of the action taken to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person's residence and of any state in which
he has a license.
A simple alterative to this amendment might be available by stamping a consent on the license and thereby making the consent a condition
precedent to driving privileges on the state's highways. There is some precedent in hunting license provisions which provided for consent to be
searched in some states.
Two problems to be considered in connection with this alternative
are the Schutt case,3 6 which invalidated a New York statute because it
did not provide for an arrest, and the possible problem of out-of-state drivers. Everyone driving in Wyoming obviously consents to the provisions
on the license he must purchase, but out-of-state drivers clearly do nothing
to give such consent. To reach them will require that the consent be
given through use of the highways, and if nonresidents must be so treated,
complications could be divided by treating residents in the same way.
GERALD RAY MASON

